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Abstract 
The notion of consciousness, animal or otherwise, has been often discussed throughout 
the history of human thought.  More recently it has become a topic for debate in philosophy 
with many competing ideas emerging.  This paper is an attempt to discuss the nature of animal 
consciousness using a phenomenological approach.  Phenomenology is a branch of philosophy 
with the goal of discovering and describing the true nature of phenomena beyond the human 
subjective experience of them.  Using the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work on 
perception, this paper argues for the acceptance of a form of consciousness in many animals 
while also seeking a better understanding of animal consciousness from a phenomenological 
approach.  The paper concludes by discussing aspects that the phenomenological approach can 
add to our limited perspective of animal consciousness. 
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Introduction 
 It’s rather easy to consider oneself conscious, the next step up is to consider other 
human beings, and finally considering the consciousness of other species entirely.  Human 
consciousness has a rich history in philosophy and with the arrival of the scientific discipline of 
psychology, science as well.  The idea of non-human consciousness however has a smaller place 
in history.  Animal consciousness has had a back seat in science and philosophy for quite some 
time and until recently it wasn’t really considered.  The rise of various animal rights movements 
has brought the idea of animal consciousness to the forefront of many issues such in areas such 
as ethical concerns, ecology and wildlife management.  In this paper, I will argue for an 
interpretation of the consciousness of animals based off of the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-1961) and integrating this theoretical approach with the recent work undertaken 
by the contemporary philosopher David Morris as well as recent scientific developments.  In 
Part I, I will give a brief history of the philosophical groundwork for animal consciousness and 
scientific debate surrounding the consciousness of animals.  In Part II, I will lay out the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Morris involving consciousness and perception before finally 
making my argument for the consciousness of other animals in Part III. 
I 
 First I will begin with an overview of a few of the more important voices in the history of 
philosophy concerning animal consciousness.  As is fitting for a discussion concerning a history 
involving philosophy and science it is best to go back to one of the first great natural 
philosophers, before the term scientist had even been invented.  Aristotle (384-322BC) spoke 
on a wide range of topics from ethics to politics and was also one of the first to catalog, 
categorize and discuss animals in a somewhat scientific way.  In On the Soul Aristotle allows for 
a small portion of animals to have thinking abilities and all animals to be capable of perceiving 
and “sense imagination”(434a).  All animals are endowed with perceptive sensations to survive 
but very few are given mental powers of calculation or “deliberative imagination”(434a).  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues that anything done under ignorance or compulsion is 
involuntary with an awareness of the “particular circumstances” of the action(1111a).  From 
that argument he goes on to allow animals at least the willingness of their actions arguing “For 
things done on account of spiritedness or desire are probably not rightly called unwilling acts.  
In the first place, none of the other animals would any longer do anything willingly,”(1111b).  
Aristotle had perhaps a better outlook on animal thought and will than what followed him in 
the Cartesian Revolution. 
 Rene Descartes (1596-1650) exerted extreme influence on western philosophy and 
many movements in philosophy can be traced back to him.  While he may have made many 
great strides in terms of understanding consciousness with the personal “I” his position on 
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animal thought was bleak when seen today under a more comprehensive perspective.  In the 
Cartesian system our physical bodies are essentially machines to house the consciousness.  
There is a duality between mind and body.  Under this system of thought animals are reduced 
to mindless automata that merely react to stimuli.  His argument for this is contained in Part V 
of the Discourse on Methods   in which he claims that because all animals possess the same 
organs as humans (brains, vocal chords ect) but do not communicate with language they must 
be lacking in some faculty.  They have the organs to communicate but instead do not and 
therefore must be just automata because even the most stupid of humans can at least 
communicate basic thoughts.  Since the animal has the organs needed but doesn’t 
communicate thoughts it must be that they have no thoughts to communicate.  The argument 
follows that because the actions and behaviors of animals can be imitated or described in a 
machine like fashion they must be analogous to machines and therefore unconscious.  This line 
of thinking has had a drastic impact on the concept of animal consciousness.  
 The Cartesian formulation of the world ushered in a new wave of thought.  The world 
could now be understood by the use of human reason and rationality alone.  Everything was 
open to understanding through the laws of physics and mathematics and rationality.  
Knowledge could be found in human rational thought alone and so all the world could be 
explained and understood.  The dualism of Descartes creates a void of meaning for the material 
objects.  Material objects could be described with mathematical formulations and so lacked any 
true meaning.  This also applied to the body which was seen as a mechanical thing with a 
separate substance of mind driving it around.  In relation to animals they were seen as just a 
mechanical body, without the mind substance and therefore were just unconscious robots.  
This of course is not the end of the debate as others have argued differently since then.  
 David Hume (1711-1776) presented another account for the consciousness of animals in 
A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume lays out an argument for animal thought and behavior 
saying ”no truth appears to be more evident, than that beast are endow’d with thought and 
reason as well as men”(176).  Hume’s argument is one of analogy in which he says that animals 
preform many of the same behaviors as humans and we cannot just assume them unconscious 
because we want to. According to Hume the mind is a blank slate upon which sense 
perceptions are the only data to enhance it.  The sense data we receive shapes the mind and 
experiences and molds consciousness.  In this way, animals would also receive sense data and 
experience which would lead to shape their thoughts and behaviors much in the same that 
humans’ experiences would also do. 
 The modern philosophical debate has exploded with various arguments for different 
levels of consciousness or states, along with much debate.  Robert Lurz has summarized the 
debate in contemporary philosophy as the contrast between various higher order theories of 
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consciousness and basic creature consciousness, or simple perceptual awareness (TPAM 5).  
Michael Antony points out that the current state of writing is saturated with what he labels as 
different “kinds” of consciousness, different “concepts” as well as different “meanings” that 
often get thrown around indiscriminately (1).  This can cause issues when trying to broach the 
subject if many people are talking about the same thing using different vernacular.  Some 
modern philosophers such as Peter Carruthers argue for the higher order theories which deny 
“phenomenal” consciousness to animals (“Animal Subjectivity”).  Lurz on the other hand has 
fiercely critiqued Carruthers and the higher order theories of consciousness (151).  Another 
philosopher Thomas Nagel, coming out of the analytic tradition, argued that we can never 
move beyond our human subjective point of view to really know the consciousness of another 
organism because we can only know that “no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an 
organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be 
that organism”(303).  The modern debate seems to go back and forth with no clear answer 
either way although one notion that has arisen from the consciousness debate is that 
consciousness is directed.  This means that one cannot be conscious of nothing at all, there is 
always some “thing” to be conscious of.  The scientific side of the debate takes its own variation 
which is different from the philosophical one. 
 The scientific debate of consciousness arouse with the advent of modern psychology.  
Psychology, the study of the mind, has had a fruitful yield in the modern era.  There has been a 
lot of good work on the study of human consciousness but this paper is concerned with the 
notion of an animal consciousness and so that is where the focus shall be.   Donald Griffin 
(1915-2003) the former animal zoologist and Harvard graduate, does an excellent summary of 
the debate in his book Animal Minds, pointing out that the study of animal consciousness has 
been largely influenced by the behaviorist movement of the early 20th century.  Griffin lays out 
3 main points of the movement as follow:  
Claim 1 is that learning and other factors of an animal’s lifetime account for almost all 
the behavior of said animal beyond its physical adaptations.  
Claim 2 is that we can only consider outside influences and observed behavior to 
account for explanations of animal behavior. 
Claim 3 is that subjective thinking should be ignored for 2 reasons 
1- They are subjective experiences that cannot be quantified nor verified 
2- They are just by products of brain activity and do not influence behavior(20-
21) 
Griffin does go on to state that claim 1 has been largely abandoned by most scientists 
and that claim 2 has been heavily modified due largely to the “cognitive revolution”  which 
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argues for various cognitive states in psychology (21).  Griffin also claims that it is obvious 
animals process information within their nervous systems but what is not clear is if there is any 
conscious awareness of this fact (22).  Since many processes within human beings also occur at 
an unconscious level, the assumption is that none of the animals information processing is 
conscious.  The crux of what Griffin points out is that there are many in the scientific 
community who are hostile to the idea of animal consciousness under the basis that it is hard to 
identify or measure quantitatively and therefore should not be talked about in a scientific 
sense.  Yet there is more to the story than just the behaviorist perspective. 
Many studies have been done on the consciousness of animal by scientists.  The field of 
cognitive ethology, which has the goal of understanding animal behavior empirically with 
detracting from the ability to make predictions with utility and also including the possibility of 
internal states of cognition , is also an area of interest within the scientific community (Kamil 
21-23).  In 2012 a document entitled the Cambridge Declaration of Consciousness was signed 
during the Francis Crick Memorial Conference.  This document is a statement about animal 
cognition which goes on to say that numerous animals possess the same neurochemical and 
physical properties in which to experience states of consciousness.  The scientists analysis 
states that there are numerous brain systems that are homologous within humans and some 
animals that react similarly with regard to microcircuitry of the brain.  Based on these findings 
the group of scientists that signed the document concluded that  
 
“The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from 
experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals 
have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of 
conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, 
the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the 
neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all 
mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these 
neurological substrates.” (Low “Cambridge..”) 
 
This statement is of course not the end of the debate surrounding animal consciousness in 
either the scientific field or the philosophical one. 
II 
 
 I will be drawing on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as the philosopher 
David Morris for my argument on the consciousness of animals.  Merleau-Ponty was a 
phenomenologist with his major work being The Phenomenology of Perception.  
Phenomenology is the study of phenomena in themselves.  Modern phenomenology is based 
on the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and can be described as an attempt to get to the 
heart of what a phenomenon truly is beyond a subjective experience or description of that 
thing.  Husserl described this as the epoché, the first step in the phenomenological reduction in 
which we bracket or refrain from judging our thoughts about the existence of the world while 
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also not taking them for granted.  In this way the phenomenological method seeks to strip away 
the subjectivity and allow the phenomena to present themselves in a true manner.   
 Merleau-Ponty argues against Husserl in this regard saying that in order to use the 
phenomenological method we must comprehend the notion that we cannot be fully separate 
from the world.  There is no way that we may become a passive objective observer of a 
phenomenon because “I cannot conceive myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere 
object of biological, psychological or sociological investigation.”(PP ix)  In our bodies we are 
trapped within the world and cannot step completely outside of it to try and investigate it.  
Furthermore Merleau-Ponty argues that we cannot resort to only empirical methods in order to 
describe things because “[a]ll my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is 
gained from my own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without 
which the symbols of science would be meaningless” and “we must begin by reawaking the 
basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression”(PP ix). The 
empirical methods of science can be seen as a “second-order expression” because all the 
knowledge described by science is a description from a human subjective view point. 
 To further clarify let us consider an example such as the color blue.  When I see the 
color blue, I experience it myself from my subjective viewpoint.  Now with a photospectrometer 
we can describe blue as being a wavelength of light at a certain frequency, acting in accordance 
with mathematical principles.  That description though, is second-order because those 
attributes or mathematical derivations themselves are expressions from a human standpoint in 
an attempt to describe how we perceive blue objectively, and yet they cannot truly be objective 
since there is no way to step outside the human body and  verify them from some other 
position.  This subjectivity does not mean that those attempted objective descriptions 
themselves are not useful or should be disregarded, only that we must be aware that they are 
still a subjective description from the human perspective. 
 Since we are forced into a subjective view of things by our very nature of being in the 
world there is of course a conundrum, namely that we are unable to step outside ourselves and 
get an objective third person perspective of experience, yet neither can we only rely on an 
empirical method such as science because it too is contained in the sphere of human 
subjectivity.  In order to examine this issue Merleau-Ponty turns to perspective itself, as the 
primary lens in which we communicate with the world.  First and foremost we are perceivers of 
things before anything else.  At every moment we are surrounded and bombarded by 
perceptions from all angles via touch, sight, sound ect.  These perceptions are our first contact 
with the world, and so in order to properly try to understand the world we must first 
understand perception itself. 
 In order to understand perception it becomes necessary to talk of the human body, the 
thing through which we perceive in the first place.  Merleau-Ponty argues that the body is 
rooted in the world and as such “the permanence of one’s own body, had only modern 
psychology analyzed it, might have led it to the body no longer conceived as an object of the 
world, but as our means of communication with it”(106).  Seen this way the body is not an 
object of experience, for that would mean I could step outside and examine it, but rather the 
body is the subject of experience.  I am my body and my body is me, I do not experience my 
body but rather my body experiences the world through my perception. In this way being is 
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rooted in a body in the world. Consequently consciousness cannot just be some metaphysical 
thing as Descartes would argue, but instead must be rooted within the body as well.   
Now if the body is the subject of perception the question arises of what consciousness 
is.  Previously I discussed that consciousness is directional, which is to say that one must always 
be conscious of something.  Seen this way, consciousness is a kind of awareness of things, or 
more properly an awareness of the perceptions we are having at that time.  Merleau-Ponty 
argues in The Phenomenology of Perception that “[t]o be a consciousness or rather to be and 
experience is to hold inner communication with the world, the body and other people, to be 
with them instead of being beside them.”(PP 111)   I argue that consciousness is an awareness 
of the perceptions we are having from the world at any moment on the subject that is our 
body.  Using Merleau-Ponty’s definition being aware of our perceptions allows us to “be and 
experience” those perceptions.  The extent of this awareness may change depending on the 
situation. For instance I may be so enthralled in a painting that I am not aware of the things 
around that painting consciously but I am still receiving the perceptions of those things. Those 
perceptions I am aware of I can say I am conscious of.  Once we are aware of the perceptions of 
the world the question is how to make sense of them and attribute meaning to them.  This is 
how the color blue becomes the color blue, or the distance between me and a chair becomes 
that distance by the attribution of meaning to the perceptions. 
 It is here that I will rely on the work of David Morris to further clarify my position.  In 
order to talk about meaning I will refer to the description of Morris in which he argues that we 
should “draw on Merleau-Ponty, who discovers that human meaning is at root a bodily 
phenomenon that emerges from the way the body fits into and is oriented by a situation 
beyond and prior to what is meant”(329).  To illustrate this concept Morris references the 
French word sens . Sens deals with direction and sensation, which is to say that we make 
meaning out of our sensations.  Morris argues this is a shift from meaning to sense, in which we 
expand the concept of meaning beyond just being attributed “in our heads”.  If our first 
communication with the world is through perception it follows that we add meaning to these 
perceptions with our sensations of them. Morris argues that “Sense entails differences that 
make a difference”(329).  In this way, sense, or meaning, can be constructed as differences in 
experience that make an actual difference to the perceiving subject.  Morris uses the example 
of glucose and a bacterium.  The presence of the glucose makes a difference in the behavior of 
the bacterium (it swims toward it), and the presence of gold does not.  The difference 
(presence of glucose) therefore makes a difference to the bacterium and so the glucose 
molecules have meaning to the bacterium and the gold would not.  If we “don’t find that 
difference making a difference, you have a dead bacterium (or one not sensitive to 
glucose).”(330).  Here Morris is making an argument on our understanding of ontology, the 
study of being, and arguing for a new way to conceive of the world as having meaning already 
inherent in many things through differences that make a difference.  I am going to extend this 
argument from meaning inherent in reality to the way we consciously construct meaning using 
the same mechanisms of differences that make a difference.  For clarification, I will use an 
analogy of a human example: a person wearing a wedding ring.  If I were single and saw a 
wedding ring on a person I found attractive I would be less willing to ask them on a date 
assuming they would say no, being married.  Now if I come across someone not wearing a 
wedding ring I find attractive I would be more willing to ask them on a date.  The difference 
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here is the presence of the wedding ring and the meaning (datable or not) is constructed by me 
as a subject of this experience, as I perceive the difference.  So the difference in experience is 
what allows me to construct meaning to the perceptions of that experience. 
 To summarize, we are born into a human body that is subject to experiences through 
perceptions and rooted in the world.  We cannot step outside this body, or the world, and so 
must accept that we are grounded in our body as a subject to the perceptions of the world 
around us.  This is our first line of communication with the world and indeed how we build the 
meaning of things around us.  Consciousness as it is must be subject to something, for we 
cannot be conscious of nothing at all. Consciousness is then seen as directed by the perceptions 
we receive as a body subject to the world since these are our first lines of communication with 
the world.  Taking these perceptions or experiences into account, we then make meaning out of 
them consciously with the identification of differences that make a difference to our 
perceptions. So my body which is embedded in the world is subject to perceptions of the world 
around me of which I then am conscious of through perception and I then make meaning of 
those perceptions and therefore subjectively construct the world around me through my 
experience. 
III 
 With consciousness embedded in the body-subject in the world, a transition to animal 
consciousness can be made.  First and foremost, there has been some issue of animal 
consciousness in the early writings of Merleau-Ponty.  Ted Toadvine discusses this in Merleau-
Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature by saying “While Merleau-Ponty’s approach retains these echos of 
the sharp divide between human and animal already sketched out in the work of his 
predecessors, in his own thinking the human-animal relation, or more generally the relation 
between life and mind, remains a point of significant tension”(83-84).  Toadvine argues that 
there are issues in which Merleau-Ponty drew a sharp distinction between human and animal 
consciousness such as the “peculiar ontological role that the human being plays, throughout 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, as being’s means of self-expression”(84).  Toadvine is pointing out that 
in some earlier works Merleau-Ponty held the condition of being human as ontologically 
significant in the way being it itself could express itself.  While this would seem to present a 
problem to my argument,   Merleau-Ponty’s later thoughts on the subject did change 
significantly.  An example of this change is found in The World of Perception which is a 
compilation of written radio lectures by Merleau-Ponty in 1948.   In that book Merleau-Ponty 
argues in that  “in fact this world is not just open to other human beings but also to animals. . 
.who dwell in it after their own fashion; they coexist in this world”(WP 70).  This change in 
thought opens up the world of perception to the animal and recognizes animal consciousness. 
 I argue that animals, having a physical body rooted in the world with similar 
morphological structures to allow for perception of the world, would be constituted as a body-
subject of the world and as such have a consciousness of those perceptions in which they 
create and discover meaning and so construct their subjective view of the world.  Many animals 
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have a very similar physical body structure as the human being.  While they may take various 
shapes and forms, they have the same basic structural components that allow them to navigate 
the world.  They have sensory organs such as ears, eyes and noses ect.  Even Descartes noted 
that animals have all the same basic features of human beings.  From the same basic make up 
comes the idea that the animal is itself also another body-subject of the world just as is the 
human being.   
 Being another body-subject of the world means the animal is also subject to perceptions 
of the world.  This would be the first line of communication to the world just as it is in the 
human being.  Animals then construct their world out of those perceptions and discover the 
meaning within creating their own subjective perspective on the world.  As human beings can 
experience a difference that makes a difference and discover meaning so too should an animal 
be able to in its construction of the world.  The creation of meaning from perception is the 
recognition of differences and not necessarily a function of some higher order thought only 
human beings have access to. (This is not to say no meaning is constructed from higher 
cognitive functions for certainly this is not the case as we can self-reflect on something and 
create and apply new meaning and indeed do all the time.  I am only claiming that it is not the 
only way to create meaning)  This can be reflected in the animal’s behaviors towards its 
environment, for example my dog may take a liking to a specific ball and exclusively carry 
around that ball.  Then for instance one day I decide the ball is too old and dirty and throw it 
away.  My dog will search endlessly for that specific ball and may even not like any new toys I 
attempt to substitute it with.  As a human being I cannot fully understand the meaning to be 
found in the ball but from the dog’s subjective experience it has discovered a meaning in it and 
so the difference of its being found or not has a meaning to the dog.  Animals communicate 
with the world and construct and discover their own meaning within from their subjective 
viewpoint through their perceptions just as human beings do, and so they would also be 
conscious of the world and their experiences in it. 
 The argument against the appearance of animals making meaning in the world is that 
while it may appear so, there is a perfectly good mechanistic explanation of the behavior and so 
any subjective experience should be discarded.  This was outlaid by Griffin earlier in the 
behavioristic model.  The argument is that somehow the human brain is the key difference in 
that our vastly superior intellect and ability for self-reflection excludes other creatures from 
conscious experience as they lack ability to inform us of their subjective experiences.  Firstly I 
must point out that the lack of ability to inform another being of a subjective experience does 
not exclude that experience from existence.  For example people with extreme mental 
disabilities may lack the ability to inform us of their personal subjective experience but we do 
not simply conclude that they therefor have no interior conscious experiences.  Another 
problem is that this outlook assumes an anthropocentric notion of consciousness, considering 
only the human subjective experience.  Meaning to an animal would be different than meaning 
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to a human and this is reflected in the behavioral differences.  Merleau-Ponty argued that 
“Thus in spite of what mechanistic biology might suggest, the world we live in is not made up 
only of things and space: some of these parcels of matter, which we call living beings, proceed 
to trace in their environment, by the way they act or behave, their very own vision of 
things.”(WP 75)  He goes on to say that if only we were to pay enough attention to and “live 
alongside” the animal world we could see this to be true.  Casting an anthropocentric lens on 
the study of animal behavior can limit our ability to understand it in any way other than by 
comparing it to human behavior, and so likewise as the saying goes if we judge a fish by its 
ability to climb trees we will think the fish very unskilled. 
 Another argument against this approach to consciousness deals with situations where a 
subject may still receive perceptions but not appear to be conscious of them like victims of 
severe strokes.  In the case of the stroke victim they would still be subject to the same 
perceptions persay, such as the light in the room or sounds or touches but they may not 
respond at all to them.  So if consciousness arises out of perception then the stroke victim 
should have a consciousness the argument goes.  In response to the stroke victim critique I 
argue that since perception is a bodily phenomenon, and the brain is wired into the body at 
every level the consciousness that arises out of bodily perceptions would be altered if there 
where damage to the body in some way.  This naturally includes the brain as the nerve center 
of the body and the filter through which many perceptions come.  In the case of the stroke 
victim, there has been severe damage to the brain, through which their perceptions are 
received and likewise it would create a different perceptual world for the victim to have access 
to.  Since consciousness, as previously mentioned, is an awareness of perceptions one must 
have the proper bodily organ in which to be aware with.  So the stroke victim with the damaged 
brain has a vastly altered perceptual field which accounts for their apparent lack of what we 
could call conscious activities.  Consciousness is still a very physical aspect of our being and as 
such damage to the physical body would alter the conscious experience. 
The phenomenon of consciousness is a very complex and difficult thing to discuss, but 
phenomenology has shown to add new avenues of thought in dealing with it.  The fields of 
Cognitive Ethology and the Cambridge declaration previously mentioned reflect a subtle shift in 
the acceptance of animal consciousness in the scientific field.  The modern philosophical 
discussions of animal consciousness present a shift toward new perspectives on the issue.  If 
Merleau-Ponty is correct and consciousness is rooted in the body stuck in the world, and Morris 
is correct that meaning can be constructed from differences that make a difference, then there 
is no reason to doubt that animals can also have conscious experience of the world.  They are 
rooted in the same body-subject experience set in the same world of perceptions.  Animals also 
experience differences that make a difference to their subjective experience and allow them to 
discover meaning in the world.  Animals are conscious beings in the world the same as humans 
are, only from a different subjective experience.  Taking a phenomenological approach to the 
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issue of animal minds opens up new directions in which we perceive the mind of another being 
and provides new insights into how we understand the phenomenon of consciousness itself.   
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